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Introduction  
An occupational license is a credential that governments require practitioners to 
obtain to work in certain occupations (Nunn 2016). Occupational licensing laws require 
workers to submit verification of training, testing, education, and pay associated fees 
prior to beginning a job in their chosen field. When implemented appropriately, the state-
mandated testing, training, and educational requirements of occupational licensure 
mitigate potentially harmful health and safety risks for the public. In some professions, 
improper practice results in serious harm to the public. Occupational licensing reduces 
the number of unqualified individuals offering their services in that profession, thus 
increasing overall public safety and welfare. However, because licensing laws are often 
established independently by each state government, significant differences and 
disparities in licensing requirements exist across states.  
Occupational licensing has grown drastically over the past fifty years, which has 
led to a greater share of American workers needing a license to work. Accounting for 
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just five percent of the labor market in the 1950’s, licensed workers now make up more 
than 25 percent of all employed Americans (U.S Treasury Office 2015). Of the 800 
occupations listed by the Bureau of Labor statistics, 284 are licensed by at least one 
state (Carpenter, et. al 2017). The percentage of workers needing licensure varies 
substantially by occupation. Legal, education, and healthcare occupations license 
workers at particularly high rates (see figure 1).  Over fifty percent of workers are 
licensed in each of these industries.   
  
  
 
Source: Current Population Survey, 2016  
Labor market economists argue that the growth in licensing has led to a structure 
of varying requirements across states, making it challenging for workers to move their 
skills across state lines, and costly for them to work in a licensed profession. Overly 
burdensome licensing requirements can create barriers to employment for individuals 
who may not actually pose a serious risk. Most economists also agree that occupational 
licensing results in higher wages for licensed workers, which in turn increases consumer 
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costs. “In occupational licensing, the prevalent costs are increased prices to consumers 
for goods and services and lost job opportunities for aspiring workers,” noted The  
Council on Licensing Enforcement and Regulation. (Carpenter and McGrath, 2015). 
Higher wages benefit licensed workers, but wage disparity can lead to inefficiency and 
unfairness, including reducing employment opportunities and depressing wages for 
excluded workers, reducing workers’ mobility across state lines, and increasing costs for 
consumers.   
University of Minnesota economics professor Morris Kleiner asserts that the 
growth of occupational licensing is restricting labor markets, innovation, and worker 
mobility resulting in 2.85 million fewer jobs nationally, with an annual cost to consumers 
of $203 billion” (Kleiner 2015). Licensing requirements such as fees, exams, and 
education requirements often drive away potential workers, especially those for whom 
the costs of licensure are too high. By imposing requirements on people seeking to 
enter licensed professions licensing reduces employment in the licensed occupation 
and hence competition, driving up the price of goods and services for consumers (U.S 
Treasury Office 2015).   
Furthermore, occupational licensing laws across states can impede the ability of 
workers to relocate across state lines. This disproportionately impacts employment 
opportunities for individuals that move from the job market in one state to another – 
such as long-term unemployed and otherwise dislocated workers seeking new 
opportunities, or members of the military and their families who are regularly moved to 
new places in their service to the country.  
For this particular analysis, I am interested in studying how the presence of 
licensing affects wages and employment levels at the state and occupation levels. Does 
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an occupation becoming licensed in one state affect wages and employment in ways 
that do not affect states without a license? Studying states is critical because licensing 
authorities are primarily state boards rather than national or local entities.  The research 
and the traditional labor market theory around licensing both suggest that wages will 
increase and employment growth will decrease for states that license a certain 
occupation. I hypothesize that the same will be true in this analysis.   
  
  
Literature Review  
The significant body of research around occupational licensing focuses on how 
licensing impacts employment, wages, prices, quality, health and safety, and 
geographic mobility. Some of these licensing effects are widely accepted as fact, while 
others do not have the body of evidence to suggest that a significant effect exists.  
Employment and Wages  
Although estimating employment effects is challenging considering the available 
data, there is evidence to suggest that occupational licensing restricts the supply of 
workers in licensed professions. Kleiner (2006) finds that from 1990-2000 employment 
growth rates are higher in unlicensed states compared to those in licensed states for 
particular occupations. Additionally, he compares growth rates in occupations with 
differing levels of licensing (licensed in all states, some but not all, not licensed in any 
state). He again finds evidence to suggest that licensing slows employment growth. 
State licensing laws that require English proficiency exams restrict the number of 
Vietnamese-American manicurists, as well as the overall number of manicurists 
according to Federman et al. (2006). Kuo (2013) finds that states with the least 
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restrictive requirements for nurse practitioners have more licensed nurse practitioners 
than the most restrictive states. In addition, research from Carol and Gaston (2013) 
finds that state licensing laws for electricians, which require passing an exam or meeting 
experience requirements, resulted in fewer per capita electricians.   
Evidence also points to a wage gap between licensed and unlicensed workers.  
The majority of these studies agree that the wage premium is somewhere between 
1020 percent. Thorton and Timmons (2010) find that licensing barbers increases wages 
by 11-22 percent compared to the unlicensed worker with the same education level. 
These authors also examined massage therapists where they found a wage premium of 
16 percent. Kleiner and Vorotnikov (2017) obtain a representative sample from all fifty 
states and perform a cross sectional analysis of licensing effects for individual states. 
They find licensing results in 10-15 percent wage increase for licensed workers. This 
work built off of an initial study which also suggests that licensing increases wages by  
10-15 percent (Kleiner and Kruger 2013)  
It should be noted that this research does not distinguish between wage gains for 
licensed practitioners and wage losses for the unlicensed who are shut out of the 
occupation. Additionally, because licensed workers generally have more training and 
education than unlicensed workers, and may differ in other ways, these wage premiums 
might reflect fundamental differences across workers rather than being a result of 
licensing regulations. Controlling for individuals within the occupation helps solve this 
issue. When controlling for the unobservable characteristics of individuals and 
occupations, the research suggests a more modest wage premium and often no effect 
at all. Gittleman, Kleiner and Klee (2015) find that licensed workers receive 8.4 percent 
percent higher wages when controlling for detailed occupation. Previously Gittleman 
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and Kleiner (2013) found that moving to a licensed occupation from an unlicensed 
occupation resulted in no wage gain. Likewise, Klee (2013) finds little evidence to 
suggest the presence of a licensing wage gain, and even finds that more stringent 
licensing regulations can sometimes result in a wage loss for licensed workers.  
  
  
Prices  
  While the research on wages and data seem to slightly differ in terms of results, 
licensing’s effect on prices is fairly predictable according to numerous studies. Kleiner 
and Kudrie (2000), Liang and Ogur (1987), Conrad and Sheldon (1982), and Shepard 
(1978) all study how stricter licensing requirements result in higher prices for dental 
services. Each study focuses on a different requirement such as difficulty of the dental 
exam, levels of licensing reciprocity or endorsement ability, and restrictions on number 
of dental hygienists. All of these studies report a price premium for states with the 
stricter licensing policies with the impact ranging from 3-7 percent. Kleiner et al. (2014) 
also studies nursing and reports a price increase of 6 percent for medium levels of 
regulation and 16 percent for high levels of regulation among nurses. Branching out of 
the medical field, Kleiner and Todd (2009) study mortgage brokers and find that 
requiring additional bonding results in 5.4 percent higher prices for mortgage services, 
but that increasing other licensing requirements shows no effect.   
Quality, Health and Safety  
  The primary purpose for licensing an occupation is to ensure safety for 
consumers, and increase the quality of the good or services provided. A range of 
studies examine the question of whether or not licensing achieves this aim which would 
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be expected if the industry is being limited to those deemed highly qualified. Larsen 
(2015), Kane, Rockoff, and Staiger (2008), Angrist and Guryan (2007), Kane and 
Staiger (2005), and Kleiner and Petree (1988) all examine teachers in efforts to 
determine licensing’s impact on quality of services provided. Teacher qualifications and 
student test scores are the primary means for measuring quality. Out of all of these 
studies, only one found that licensing had a significant effect on quality of teaching 
services provided. Larsen (2015) finds when measuring test scores and teacher 
qualifications that stricter licensing requirements in high-income districts increases 
quality in both measures. Interestingly, there is no effect in either measure when 
examining low-income school districts. Kleiner and Kudrle (2000) find no effect on the 
amount of dental repair needed when licensing requirements are increased, while Holen  
(1978) did find an increase in quality when entry requirements were increased. Klee 
(2013), Carpenter (2012), and Healey (1973) find no quality improvements when 
licensing requirements were increased for accountants, florists, and lab technicians 
respectively.   
Interstate Mobility  
  Licensing can be a barrier to interstate mobility due to the fact that licensing 
primarily occurs at the state level. New licenses are typically required when a worker 
wishes to move across state lines while working in a licensed occupation. The time and 
money costs that must be incurred to get a new state license often deters people from 
moving. This licensing impact is the most difficult to study due to the complexities of 
how the economy affects migration patterns. Research studying the Nurse Licensure 
Interstate Compact, which allows licensed nurses to practice in any state participating in 
the interstate compact, finds positive effects of the compact’s adoption on interstate 
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mobility (DePasquale and Strange 2014). The effects are particularly positive for those 
in the northeast where workers are more likely to live near a state border. In analysis 
done by the White House occupational licensing report on data from the Survey of  
Income and Program Participation, the authors conclude that licensed workers are 20  
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percent less likely to move across state lines than non-licensed workers (White House 
2015).    
Research Design and Hypothesis  
Data  
This analysis uses original time-series licensing data from The Council of State 
Governments along with occupational employment data from the Bureau of Labor 
statistics (BLS). BLS’ Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) program produces 
annual employment and wage estimates for over 800 occupations using the standard 
occupation code (SOC) classification system. The data can be accessed at the state, 
metropolitan area, or nation-wide level. This analysis concentrated on state level data 
since most occupational licensing is administered by state regulatory boards. I collected 
primary licensing data by looking at the state statutes and administrative regulations 
through an online legislative tracking clearinghouse called StateNet. This data was 
collected as a part of a larger project, of which I was a researcher for The Council of 
State Governments (CSG). CSG collected several data points such as required 
education, cost of license, experience or training required, number of exams. For this 
analysis, I was only interested in year of initial licensure. This is the year that acquiring a 
license for a particular occupation was made mandatory by state statute. CSG collected 
licensing data for 34 different occupations. The chosen occupations were selected by 
four primary criteria. The occupation must be licensed in at least 30 states, require less 
than a Bachelor’s degree, have projected employment growth rate for 2014-2024 at 
national average or higher, and must total current employment levels of 10,000 or 
greater, resulting in a total of 34 occupations.   
I chose massage therapists and electricians for this analysis because these 
occupations have more variation in the number of states that license than other 
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occupations we collected data for. Massage therapists and electricians are licensed by 
43 and 44 states respectively, with some states only recently requiring a license. This is 
more variation than nurses, for example, which all 50 states have licensed for many 
years. The data needs to have a good mix of licensed vs. non-licensed states in order to 
capture any licensing effects that might be taking place.   
Variables  
  The primary independent variable within the data is a dummy variable “licensed” 
which indicates whether or not a state licenses an occupation in a given year. My 
dependent variables came from the OES data and include total employment and 
median hourly wages. Wages for the OES survey are straight-time, gross pay, exclusive 
of premium pay for things like overtime, on-call pay, holiday bonuses, severance pay, 
etc. The BLS wage estimates are collected annually and are made up of base pay, 
commissions, production bonuses, and tips. The OES program began collecting data for 
individual occupations in 1997, but changed the way they defined occupations to use  
SOC codes in 1999. As a result, my dataset spans from 1999-2016. The BLS houses  
OES data for each year in different files. I searched each year’s state-level file by the 
SOC code for massage therapists and electricians to obtain that year’s employment and 
wage data for each state. I then combined each year’s OES data with the licensing data 
from CSG to finalize my dataset.     
  
  
Design and Hypothesis  
This analysis uses two different approaches to study the effect of a state 
changing its licensing policy on measurable outcomes. In particular, I study how a state 
switching from unlicensed to licensed for certain occupations affects the measurable 
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economic outcomes of total employment and hourly median wages. From the dataset, 
states were chosen that became licensed from 1999-2016, based on the time range of 
the OES data, and compared to control states that do not license the occupation. A 
difference-in-difference analysis can naturally be applied studying the treatment groups 
who enacted a salient reform and control groups who did not. Rather than doing a 
formal regression analysis, simple four-cell difference-in-differences tables will be the 
most understandable and useful to explain a potential licensing effect. To formalize 
further, here is an example from the dataset. Iowa introduced a license requirement for 
electricians in 2007 but Indiana does not have one. I made the four-cell table calculating 
average electrician wages in the years prior to 2007 in Iowa, average electrician wages 
in the years prior to 2007 in Indiana, average electrician wages in the years 2007 and 
after in Iowa, and average electrician wages in the years 2004 and after in Indiana. I 
then calculated the difference-in-differences estimator based on the differences 
between the states.   
As an alternative, and likely more convincing method, I plot wages for the 
treatment and control states with hourly median wages the vertical axis and year on the 
horizontal axis. Drawing a vertical line at the initial licensure year and plotting the time 
series of wages for Iowa and Indiana will show the potential licensing effect. Deviations 
from how wages were trending prior to licensure can be attributed to licensing if the 
effect is similar across several states. Although this analysis will not test statistical 
significance, the magnitude of economic significance will be benchmarked to prior 
literature which says that licensing increases wages and decreases employment growth 
by 10-15%. Deviations in wage and employment trend lines after licensing greater than 
10%, as compared to the control state, will be considered economically significant.   
 Available data limited the options for choosing treatment and control states. In order to 
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capture a potential licensing effect, data needs to be available for multiple years before 
and after initial licensure. Because the OES data spans from 1999-2016, this limits my 
analysis to states who first began licensing between these years. The control states 
were chosen from the list of states who do not license the occupation at all. There are 
seven states who do not license massage therapists and six states who do not license 
electricians. The list of states who do not license was compared to the list of states who 
began licensing between 1999-2016 to generate the comparisons used for this analysis. 
States were matched together based on geography and relative population size.  It is 
important to note that comparing a treatment state to a control state only works if they 
are trending in the same direction prior to licensure. The parallel trend assumption 
requires that in the absence of treatment, the difference between the compared states 
remains constant over time. If they are not trending in the same direction, I will discuss 
why the control state is not a good comparison for the treatment state.  
The difference-in-difference method removes bias in post-licensing comparisons 
between the treatment and control group that could be the result from permanent 
differences between those groups, as well as bias from comparisons over time in the 
treatment group that could be the result of trends due to other causes of the outcome. 
Ultimately this analysis allows me to visually test the null hypothesis that licensing has 
no effect on wages in the states that license the occupation. I performed the four-cell 
difference-in-differences analysis and graph median hourly wages and total employment 
for two different occupations and several sets of states. After visually inspecting the 
graphs, I will be able to reject or fail to reject the null hypothesis that licensing has no 
effect on wages and employment.   
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Results  
Electricians  
1. Total Employment in Iowa (Licensed 2007) & Indiana (No License)  
  
 
  
  
2. Median Wages in Iowa (Licensed 2007) & Indiana (No License)  
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3. Total Employment in Kentucky (Licensed 2001) & Missouri (No License)  
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4. Median Wages in Kentucky (Licensed 2001) & Missouri (No License)  
 
  
5. Total Employment in Massachusetts (Licensed 2007) & New York (No  
License)   
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6. Median Wages in Massachusetts (Licensed 2007) & New York (No License)  
 
  
Massage Therapists  
7. Total Employment in Illinois (Licensed 2005) & Indiana (No License)  
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8. Median Wages in Illinois (Licensed 2005) & Indiana (No License)  
 
  
9. Total Employment in Nebraska (Licensed 2007) & Kansas (No License)  
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10. Median Wages in Nebraska (Licensed 2007) & Kansas (No License)   
 
11. Total Employment in Michigan (Licensed 2009) & Minnesota (No License)  
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12. Median Wages in Michigan (Licensed 2009) & Minnesota (No License)  
 
When comparing the time series data plotted for licensed and non-licensed 
states, there does not seem to be evidence that a wage premium or employment gap 
exist attributable to licensing. The analysis fails to find evidence that an occupation 
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becoming licensed has an effect on wages and employment. However as referenced in 
the literature review, the ways in which licensing affects these economic outcomes 
varies by occupation. Having only analyzed two occupations, I do not believe that we 
can apply this result to all occupations generally. There may be a wage premium or 
employment gap in other occupations as a result of licensing, but for electricians and 
massage therapists such a conclusion cannot be reached.   
This null result is more convincing for electricians than massage therapists. 
Figures 1 and 2 compare employment and wages Iowa (licensed 2007) and Indiana (no 
license). The wage trend lines move almost identically in figure 2, while employment in 
Iowa seems to steadily increase year to year, which does not align with the hypothesis. 
If licensing restricted employment for electricians in Iowa, we would expect to see the 
trend line decrease at a faster rate than Indiana after 2007. Figures 3 and 4 comparing 
Kentucky (licensed 2001) and Missouri (no license) show a similar pattern. The trend 
line for wages moves almost identically between the two states with only very slight 
deviations. One could argue that the employment trend lines do not hold to the parallel 
trend assumption, but I think the lines post-licensure move closely enough together that 
they are a good fit for comparison. The lines are nearly identical after 2001 with no 
visible effect from licensure. Likewise, in figure 6, Massachusetts and New York do not 
trend parallel initially. However, starting in 2005 wages do trend parallel and fit very 
tightly together even after Massachusetts became licensed in 2007.   
These graphs show a convincing null result for electricians. When looking at the 
plotted time series data, the trend lines barely changes at all upon initial licensure. If a 
licensing effect did exist, we would expect the line to trend upward for wages and 
downward for employment after a state licenses electricians.  However, when 
comparing with the control states that do not license, the trend lines hardly deviates at 
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all upon initial licensure. This result is consistent across all three sets of state 
comparisons.  
The result seems to hold even for an occupation within an entirely different 
industry. The trend lines for massage therapists are more erratic, but still does not seem 
to support a possible licensing effect. There must be other effects at work causing the 
wage and employment lines to shift, but these shifts do not occur in sync with the 
treatment state adopting a license requirement. In figure 7 employment is increasing at  
a faster rate for Illinois (licensed 2005) than Indiana (no license) which again contradicts 
the hypothesis that licensing would restrict employment growth in the licensed state. 
Likewise, in figure 8 the wage trend line for Illinois decreases after 2005 while wages 
are growing in Indiana. This is the opposite of what should be occurring according to the 
hypothesis. Figure 9 shows employment trend lines in Kansas (no license) and  
Nebraska (licensed 2007) staying relatively constant to each other. There is a significant 
deviation from 2011-2014, with Kansas’ employment increasing by almost 50%, 
however 2014 and 2015 show that figure regressing back towards the mean which 
shows that this was a temporary spike rather than a lasting increase in employment 
growth rate. Figures 10, 11, and 12 all seem to be violating the parallel trend 
assumption of difference in difference, and therefore I do not think we can make 
definitive comparisons between states. Overall these results are less convincing for 
massage therapists, but if a licensing effect was as certain as the literature indicates, 
we should see evidence in the graphs. No evidence is present, and therefore I do not 
believe we can conclude that such an effect exists for either occupation.    
There are sizeable gaps in the data in figures 5, 9, 11, and 12. These gaps are 
due to wage or employment estimates not being available for that year or years. I do not 
believe these gaps are significant to the conclusion because in each instance there is 
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three years worth of data after the gap to analyze how wages were trending prior to 
licensure. The gaps in the data occurred far enough before initial licensure that they 
should not be significant.   
The appendix contains initial four cell difference-in-difference tables. These 
tables also indicate that no clear effect exists upon initial licensure. There are no 
identifiable patterns among the state comparisons between wages and employment pre 
and post licensure. However, these tables are generally only helpful when a clear 
pattern does exist. They are almost certainly picking up a lot of unidentifiable noise. This 
analysis primarily focuses on the graphs as a better means for identifying a potential 
effect.   
Discussion  
It may be the case that a licensing effect takes many years to be seen. The 
increase in wages and decrease in employment could be a slow, gradual process over 
the course of many years that eventually restricts entrants into the profession, but does 
not do so initially. As discussed in the literature review, when controlling for state and 
occupation fixed effects, the licensing wage premium shrinks. Most of these studies 
employ very large panel datasets that span 20-30 years. If the wage premium is smaller 
than originally theorized, it may be even smaller or even totally negligible within the first 
few years of initial licensure.   
Perhaps it is also the case that the licensing requirements adopted are not 
severe enough to deter an aspiring practitioner from entering the occupation.  
Electricians  
States  Experience  
No. Of 
Exams  
Length of 
Renewal  
Continuing 
Education   
Initial  
Cost  
Renewal 
Cost  
Iowa 16000, h 1  3  18  75  75 
Kentucky  4, y  1  1  6  150 50 
Massachusetts 8000, h 1  3 45  330 104  
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Massage Therapists  
States  
Training 
Hours  
No. Of 
Exams  
Length of 
Renewal  
Continuing 
Education  
Initial  
Cost  
Renewal 
Cost  
Illinois 600 1  2 48  370  87.5  
Michigan 500  1  3 54  290 115 
Nebraska 1000 1  2  24   322 127 
  
The above tables outline the licensing requirements for electricians and massage 
therapist in each treatment state where a license was adopted. Based on the previous 
literature, if a licensing effect did exist for these occupations, you would expect the 
effect to be even more noticeable in the graphs for Nebraska and Iowa. The training and 
experience requirements for these two states are double the requirements for the other 
states who also recently adopted a license. It is important to note a significant difference 
between these two occupations. The fact that an electricians license requires 
experience hours means that the non-licensed worker can still perform the duties of an 
electrician as an apprentice. They are still earning money and working as an electrician 
underneath a someone with a license. Hence the licensed is not necessarily a barrier to 
enter the occupation, but a barrier to upward mobility within the occupation. A massage 
therapy license requires training hours from an approved training program. These hours 
are different from experience because they are instructional hours that take place in a 
school and not in an actual work setting. The aspiring massage therapist is statutorily 
forbidden to perform the duties of a massage therapist without these training hours. 
Therefore, in this instance the license is a barrier to enter the occupation. This 
distinction is important particularly for electricians. It could be the case that these 
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licensing requirements do not restrict employment or deter entry into the occupation 
because the requirements can be achieved over time while still practicing in the 
profession. I still initially expected the requirements for massage therapist to be severe 
enough to deter entry although the analysis did show that to be the case.     
Another possible reason for this result is a violation of the difference-in-difference 
assumption that there are no confounding policies or spillover effects from events 
outside of licensure that are affecting these figures. One major economic shock that 
certainly impacted wages and employment nationwide was the great recession of the 
late 2000s. Having treatment and control states helps to control for the recession effects 
consistent across all states, but some states were hit harder and took longer to recover. 
Spillover effects from the recession are likely captured in the graphs, and could lead to 
false conclusions. A state like Michigan, for example, saw a steep drop in employment 
for massage therapist around the time where regulation began. However this also 
coincided with the years of the recession where Michigan’s state economy was hit 
particularly hard due failures in the automotive industry. The spillover from those effects 
are likely captured within the graphs. However the consistency of the trend lines across 
state comparisons, particularly among electricians, leads me to believe that state 
recession spillover effects are not effecting the results.     
   This null result is important to policy makers who are always looking to grow 
their state’s economy. Occupational licensing reform has been a workforce priority of 
the two most recent presidential administrations with President Obama’s administration 
releasing a 76-page policy framework for state officials, and the Trump administration 
awarding large grants for state occupational licensing reform. However, if the result of a 
state licensing a certain occupation is negligible, policymakers should focus their efforts 
elsewhere when figuring out how to grow their state economies. Arguments from 
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publicized reports from the Institute of Justice and the Obama Administration say that 
removing these licensing barriers will result in an influx of new practitioners into the 
occupation which will stimulate job growth. The evidence from this analysis does not 
show that this would be the case. This analysis finds no evidence that licensing effects 
wages or total employment in any visible way. If an occupation becoming licensed does 
not affect wages or employment, then deregulating an occupation likely won’t affect 
these outcomes either. BLS studied the history of states de-licensing occupations, and 
found there have only been eight instances where a state completely removed a 
requirement for licensure (Thornton and Timmons 2015). One of these instances was 
private investigators in Colorado who made acquiring a license a voluntary activity in 
2011.   
 
  
As this figure indicates, when compared with Utah who has licensed private 
investigators since 1995, there does not seem to be a drastic change in employment 
after the private investigator’s license became voluntary in 2011. Colorado saw peak 
employment of private investigators in 2007 while the occupation was still regulated. It 
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would not make sense to conclude that removing the licensing requirement resulted in a 
new influx of workers. The increase from 2011 to 2015 seems to be more due to 
postrecession regression to the mean rather than a result of the occupation being 
delicensed.   
Limitations  
  The most significant limitation in this analysis is the number of years where data 
was able to be retrieved. Due to changes in the standard occupation classification 
system, data was only collected from 1999-2016. As speculated in the section above, 
wage premiums and employment shifts due to licensing could take many years to be 
seen in a state’s economy. Ideally this analysis could be done with 30-40 years of data 
to see how wages and employment trend for several decades after an occupation 
becomes licensed. This also limits the number of occupations and state comparisons 
available for analysis. To have proper treatment and control states, the data must have 
a mix of states who began licensing after 1999 licensed vs. non-licensed states. With 
more years available, the analysis would be able to include occupations where states 
primarily began licensing it before 1999. Perhaps the wage and employment trends 
would look differently in these occupations that have been licensed for longer amounts 
of time. Expanding the analysis to include more occupations and more state 
comparisons would strengthen the results.  
  Expanding the research to include more occupations is particularly important for 
policymakers who wish to enact salient licensing reform. Electricians and massage 
therapists are occupations that fit the methodological needs of this analysis, however 
the employment levels for these occupations as a percentage of the total labor force is 
small. If a policy maker were interested in licensing reform that would be felt by a 
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greater percentage of practitioners, he would likely choose occupations such as nurses 
or teachers which are have both been highly regulated for many years. Reforming 
licensing among these occupations would be felt more than reform among electricians 
and massage therapists.   
  Lastly this analysis does not employ any formal statistical methods. I did not set a 
level of statistical significance for the results, and did not produce standard errors. 
However, given the analysis finds zero licensing effect, this is not important. The clear 
and transparent results the methods of this analysis provide is more valuable to a 
policymaker than complex regression techniques that produce standard errors. The 
economic significance of this analysis is equally important for policy analysis. On 
economic significance grounds, the evidence of this analysis is clear that the licensing 
effects are not meaningfully significant because they are not visible and consistent 
across the state comparisons.   
Conclusions  
  The findings of this research fail conclude that a wage premium or employment 
gap exist when comparing licensed vs non-licensed states for electricians and massage 
therapists. When graphing trend lines for total employment and median wages in 
treatment and control states, there seems to be no apparent change attributable to a 
state adopting a license. This result is contrary to the hypothesis and does not generally 
agree with the research which says that licensing premiums increase wages by 10-15% 
and slows employment growth rates in licensed states. Licensing has recently been a 
trendy topic for policymakers, however this analysis does not find evidence that more 
government regulation for certain occupations will have any significant impact on wage 
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or employment growth for state economies. Future research should include more 
occupations and longer time series in order to strengthen these results.   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Appendix  
Electricians  
   
Average Pre 2007 
Median Wages  
Average Post 2007 
Median Wages  
Licensing 
Effect  
Indiana (No License)  23.04  26.76     
Iowa (Licensed 2007)  18.54  
-4.51  
22.96  
-3.80  
   
0.71  
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Dif-in-dif estimator  
  
Average Pre 2007 
Employment  
Average Post 2007 
Employment  
   
Indiana (No License)  15423.75  14231.00     
Iowa (Licensed 2007) Dif-in-
dif estimator  
6151.25  
-9272.50  
6956.00  
-7275.00  
   
1997.50  
  
  
Average Pre 2001 
Median Wages  
Average Post 2001 
Median Wages  
Licensing 
Effect  
Missouri (No License)  22.24  26.01     
Kentucky (Licensed  
2001)  
Dif-in-dif estimator  
   
17.10  
-5.14  
Average Pre 2001 
Employment  
20.42  
-5.59  
Average Post 2001 
Employment  
   
-0.45  
   
Missouri (No License)  12580.00  10891.88     
Kentucky (Licensed  
2001)  
Dif-in-dif estimator  
9650.00  
-2930.00  
8108.13  
-2783.75  
   
146.25  
  
   
Average Pre 2007 
Median Wages  
Average Post 2007  Licensing Median 
Wages  Effect  
New York (No License)  26.27  30.72    
Massachusetts (Licensed  
2007)  
Dif-in-dif estimator  
   
23.79  
-2.48  
Average Pre 2007 
Employment  
   
28.47  
-2.25  
Average Post 2007 
Employment  
0.23  
   
New York (No License)  39968.57  36356.00    
Massachusetts (Licensed  
2007)  
Dif-in-dif estimator  
13111.25  
-26857.32  
12949.00    
-23407.00  3450.32  
  
  
Massage Therapists  
   
 Average Pre 2005 
Median Wages  
Average Post 2005 
Median Wages  
Licensing 
Effect  
Indiana (No License)   14.59  13.40     
Iliinois (Licensed 2005)  
Dif-in-dif estimator  
   
 15.48  
0.89  
Average Pre 05 
Employment  
14.45  
1.05  
Average Post 05 
Employment  
   
0.16  
Licensing 
Effect  
Indiana (No License)   893.33  1010.00     
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Iliinois (Licensed 2005) 
Dif-in-dif estimator  
 3018.33  
2125.00  
3285.00  
2275.00  
   
150.00  
  
   
Average Pre 2007 
Median Wages  
Average Post 2007 
Median Wages  
Licensing 
Effect  
Kansas (No license)  12.79  14.86     
Nebraska (Licensed 2007)  
Dif-in-dif estimator  
   
12.00  
-0.79  
Average Pre 2007 
Employment  
13.28  
-1.58  
Average Post 2007 
Employment  
   
-0.79  
Licensing 
Effect  
Kansas (No license)  356.67  558.89     
Nebraska (Licensed 2007) Dif-
in-dif estimator  
80.00  
-276.67  
358.89  
-200.00  
   
76.67  
  
   
Average Pre 2009 
Median Wages  
Average Post 2009 
Median Wages  
Licensing 
Effect  
Minnesota (No License)  18.83  19.17     
Michigan (Licensed 2009)  
Dif-in-dif estimator  
   
13.40  
-5.44  
Average Pre 2009 
Employment  
17.43  
-1.74  
Average Post 2009 
Employment  
   
3.70  
Licensing 
Effect  
Minnesota (No License)  733.75  2008.57     
Michigan (Licensed 2009) Dif-
in-dif estimator  
1050.00 
316.25  
1757.14 
-251.43  
   
-567.68  
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